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Abstract
There is an urgent need to develop new methodology for the design and anal-
ysis of replication studies. Recently, a reverse-Bayes method called the sceptical
p-value has been proposed for this purpose; the inversion of Bayes’ theorem al-
lows us to mathematically formalise the notion of scepticism, which in turn can
be used to assess the agreement between the findings of an original study and
its replication. However, despite its Bayesian nature, the method relies on tail
probabilities as primary inference tools. Here, we present an extension that uses
Bayes factors as an alternative means of quantifying evidence. This leads to a
new measure for evaluating replication success, the sceptical Bayes factor: Con-
ceptually, the sceptical Bayes factor provides a bound for the maximum level of
evidence at which an advocate of the original finding can convince a sceptic who
does not trust it, in light of the replication data. While the sceptical p-value can
only quantify the conflict between the sceptical prior and the observed replica-
tion data, the sceptical Bayes factor also takes into account how likely the data are
under the posterior distribution of the effect conditional on the original study, al-
lowing for stronger statements about replication success. Moreover, the proposed
method elegantly combines traditional notions of replication success; it ensures
that both studies need to show evidence against the null, while at the same time
penalising incompatibility of their effect estimates. Case studies from the Re-
producibility Project: Cancer Biology and the Social Sciences Replication Project
show the advantages of the method for the quantitative assessment of replicability.
Key words: Replication, reverse-Bayes, Bayesian hypothesis testing, Bayes factor,
sceptical p-value
1 Introduction
As a consequence of the so-called replication crisis, the conduct of replication studies has
increased considerably (Errington et al., 2014; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration,
2015; Camerer et al., 2016, 2018; Cova et al., 2018). Despite the fact that most researchers agree
on the importance of replication studies, there is currently no agreement on a statistical crite-
rion for replication success. Instead, replication projects typically report the results of several
different analysis approaches which can roughly be divided by two spectra: Frequentist or
Bayesian and based on hypothesis testing or parameter estimation.
Among frequentist methods, assessing whether original and replication studies both achieve
statistical significance (“vote-counting”) is most commonly used but has also been criticized
for many reasons. For example, non-significant replication results are expected if the original
finding is a false positive (e. g. with 95% probability if the significance level is 5%). They are
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also expected with non-negligible probability if the underlying effect is present (Goodman,
1992; Senn, 2002). Conversely, when the effect estimate of the replication is much smaller than
the estimate from the original study, statistical significance can still be achieved by increasing
the sample size of the replication.
Proponents of parameter estimation rather assess the compatibility between the effect es-
timates from original and replication study. A popular method is to examine whether the
replication effect estimate is within a 95% prediction interval based on the original effect es-
timate (Patil et al., 2016) which is equivalent to a meta-analytic Q-test of both estimates at
the 5% significance level. Several extensions of this method exist (see e. g. Mathur and Van-
derWeele, 2017; Pawel and Held, 2020). However, these procedures typically have very low
power, especially when only a single replication is conducted (Hedges and Schauer, 2019). If
the studies are underpowered estimates that go in opposite directions may even be considered
compatible which seems to contradict with common intuition about replication success. An
estimation-based approach that goes one step further is to synthesise both effect estimates
using meta-analysis. When conducting a replication study, researchers want to challenge
the findings from the original study results with the results from the replication study. It
is questionable whether combining the effect estimates from both studies and treating them
as interchangeable is a reasonable way to answer this question, especially in the presence of
publication bias and questionable research practices (Held, 2020b).
In the Bayesian framework only a few contributions have been made regarding the assess-
ment of replication success. Bayarri and Mayoral (1999, 2002b,a) consider a hierarchical model
of effect estimates in the replication context which can be used for planning and analysis of
replication studies. They explored several analysis strategies to quantify replication success,
e. g. Bayesian hypothesis testing using Bayes factors, but also the analysis of the width of a
highest posterior density interval of the difference between the effect estimates. A Bayesian
meta-analysis method to synthesise original and replication estimates that adjusts for publica-
tion bias was proposed by van Aert and van Assen (2017). Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014);
Ly et al. (2018); Harms (2019) introduced and refined the replication Bayes factor which quan-
tifies the evidence for the null hypothesis of no effect against the alternative hypothesis that
the effect is distributed according to the effects’ posterior distribution conditional on the data
from the original study. The replication Bayes factor was subsequently used in the analysis of
the Social Sciences Replication Project (Camerer et al., 2018).
A method that offers a Bayes–frequentist compromise, the sceptical p-value, was recently
proposed by Held (2020b). In this approach, the prior distribution of the effect is determined
such that conditional on the original study, the (1− α) credible interval of the posterior distri-
bution of the effect just includes zero. This prior corresponds to the objection of a sceptic who
argues that the original finding is no longer significant when combined with a sufficiently
sceptical prior. Replication success at level α is now achieved if the tail probability of the
replication estimate under its prior predictive distribution is smaller than α, rendering the
sufficiently sceptical prior unrealistic. The smallest level α at which replication success can be
declared corresponds to the sceptical p-value, similar to the duality of ordinary p-values and
confidence intervals. The method comes with appealing properties: The sceptical p-value is
never smaller than the ordinary p-values from both studies ensuring that they both provide
evidence against the null, while it also takes into account the size of their effect estimates,
penalising the case when the replication estimate is smaller than the original estimate.
Despite the methods’ Bayesian nature, it relies on tail probabilities as primary inference
tools. An attractive alternative is the Bayes factor since it allows for direct quantification of
evidence for one hypothesis versus another, whereas the p-value can do so only indirectly. For
this reason, we extended the reverse-Bayes procedure from Held (2020b) to use Bayes factors
for the purpose of quantifying evidence. This extension was suggested by Consonni (2019)
and Pericchi (2020) independently in response to Held (2020b).
The inclusion of Bayes factors lead to a new quantity which we call the sceptical Bayes fac-
tor. Unlike standard forward-Bayes methods, but similar to the sceptical p-value, the proposed
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method elegantly combines traditional notions of replication success: It ensures that both stud-
ies need to show evidence against the null while at the same time penalising incompatibility
of their effect estimates. However, while the sceptical p-value quantifies compatibility only
indirectly through conflict with the sceptical prior, the sceptical Bayes factor evaluates directly
how likely the replication data are to occur under an advocacy prior (the posterior of the
effect conditional on the original study). This more direct assessment of compatibility allows
for stronger statements about the degree of replication success.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides definition and properties of the
sceptical Bayes factor along with a comparison to other measures of replication success. Case
studies from the Reproducibility Project: Cancer Biology (Errington et al., 2014) (Section 3.1)
and the Social Sciences Replication Project (Camerer et al., 2018) (Section 3.2) illustrate how
the method works in practice. Section 4 provides a discussion of the strengths, limitations,
and extensions of the method. Finally, the appendices give insight into some technical details.
2 Methods
2.1 Notation and assumptions
We denote the underlying effect by θ and effect estimates by θˆo and θˆr with their subscript
indicating whether they come from the original or the replication study. Let the corresponding
(known) standard errors be denoted by σo and σr and the sceptical prior variance by σ2s = g · σ2o
where g = σ2s /σ2o is the relative sceptical prior variance (relative to the variance of the original
effect estimate σ2o ). We define the variance ratio as c = σ2o /σ2r and denote the z-values of
original and replication study by zo = θˆo/σo and zr = θˆr/σr.
All concepts discussed in this paper are derived under the assumption that after a suit-
able transformation, effect estimates are normally distributed with known variances. The
normal model in combination with conjugate priors makes it possible to obtain closed-form
expressions in many cases which allows us to easily study limiting behaviour and facilitates
interpretability. This framework is similar to standard meta-analysis and covers a wide range
of practically relevant scenarios.
2.2 Bayes factors
In the Bayesian hypothesis testing framework, the Bayes factor (BF) is a commonly used quan-
tity to compare the plausibility of two competing hypotheses, say H1 and H2, with respect to
the observed data x (Kass and Raftery, 1995). It is defined by
BF1:2(x) =
f (x |H1)
f (x |H2) =
∫
Θ1
f (x | θ1) f (θ1)dθ1∫
Θ2
f (x | θ2) f (θ2)dθ2 ,
where θ1 ∈ Θ1 are the parameters for the model under H1 and θ2 ∈ Θ2 are the parameters for
the model under H2, not necessarily with the same dimension. Note that if all parameters are
fixed, the BF is the usual likelihood ratio (for nested models), while for models with random
parameters it is the ratio of the marginal likelihoods. The BF can be interpreted in several
ways, for example it represents the updating factor of the prior odds Pr(H1)/Pr(H2) to the
posterior odds Pr(H1 | x)/Pr(H2 | x) after observing the data. Moreover, it is not necessary
to regard one of the models as “true” and the other as “false”, as the BF can be interpreted
as how likely the data were predicted by H1 compared to H2. Table 1 shows a widely used
classification of Bayes factors (Kass and Raftery, 1995).
2.3 Reverse-Bayes analysis
The idea of reversing Bayes’ theorem was first proposed by Good (1950) but remained unex-
plored until Matthews (2001a) introduced the Analysis of Credibility, which in turn lead to new
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Table 1: Classification of Bayes factors proposed by Kass and Raftery (1995)
log10 BF1:2 BF1:2 Evidence against H2
0 to 1/2 1 to 3.2 not worth a bare mention
1/2 to 1 3.2 to 10 substantial
1 to 2 10 to 100 strong
> 2 > 100 decisive
developments in reverse-Bayes analysis (Matthews, 2001b; Greenland, 2006, 2011; Held, 2013;
Colquhoun, 2017; Matthews, 2018; Held, 2019, 2020b). Common to these developments is that
first a certain property of the posterior (or marginal likelihood) is fixed. Then Bayes’ theorem
is used backwards to obtain the prior distribution which combined with the data leads to the
fixed posterior or marginal likelihood.
In this paper, we consider a two-stage procedure that naturally suits to the replication
setting: We first determine the sufficiently sceptical prior of the effect such that the original
result is no longer convincing in terms of its Bayes factor. Using another Bayes factor, we then
quantify replication success by comparing how likely the replication data are predicted by
the sufficiently sceptical prior relative to an advocacy prior, which is the posterior of the effect
conditional on the original data and an uninformative prior. The following two sections will
explain this procedure in more detail.
2.4 Data from the original study
For the effect estimate θˆo | θ ∼ N(θ, σ2o ) from the original study consider BFo(g), the BF com-
paring the point null hypothesis H0 : θ = 0 to the local alternative HS : θ ∼ N(0, g · σ2o ) as
a function of the relative sceptical prior variance g for fixed θˆo. It follows from well known
results (see e. g. Bernardo and Smith, 2000, Appendix A.2) that the marginal distribution of
the original effect estimate under HS is θˆo |HS ∼ N(0, σ2o · [1+ g]), and thus the analytical form
of BFo(g) is
BFo(g) ≡ BF0:S(θˆo; g) =
√
1+ g · exp
{
−1
2
· g
1+ g
· z2o
}
. (1)
1
1/10
1/100
0 1 4 9 16 25
Relative sceptical prior variance g
B
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(g
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Figure 1: BFo(g) as a function of relative sceptical prior variance g for different values of
|zo| = |θˆo|/σo. Minima BFo are indicated by dots (•). Dashed vertical lines indicate sufficiently
sceptical relative prior variance gγ at level γ = 1/10, if existent for corresponding |zo|.
The BF from equation (1) is shown in Figure 1 as a function of g and for different values
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of |zo|. For fixed zo, it is well known that this BF is bounded from below by
BFo =
{
|zo| · exp(−z2o/2) ·
√
e for |zo| > 1
1 for |zo| ≤ 1
which is reached at g = max{0, z2o − 1} (Edwards et al., 1963). Further increasing the relative
sceptical prior variance increases (1) indefinitely because of the Jeffreys-Lindley’s paradox,
i. e. BFo(g) → ∞ for g → ∞ (Bernardo and Smith, 2000, Section 6.1.4). Hence, for a relative
sceptical prior variance g ∈ [0, g], the resulting BF will be BFo(g) ∈ [BFo, 1].
Similar to the derivation of the sceptical p-value, we now apply reverse-Bayes analysis.
To do so, we fix a level γ above which the original finding is no longer convincing to us.
For example, γ could be 1/10; the level for strong evidence against H0 according to the
classification from Kass and Raftery (1995). Suppose now there exists a gγ ≤ g such that
g ∈ [0, gγ] implies that BFo(g) ∈ [γ, 1]. The sufficiently sceptical prior is then given by
θ ∼ N(0, gγ · σ2o ) and it can be interpreted as the view of a sceptic who argues that given their
prior belief about the effect θ, the observed θˆo cannot convince them about the presence of an
effect at level γ.
From Figure 1 we can see that the more “compelling” the original result (i. e. the larger
|zo|), the smaller the sufficiently sceptical relative prior variance gγ needs to be in order to
make the result no longer convincing at level γ. If |zo| is not sufficiently large, BFo(g) will be
always increasing in g (if |zo| ≤ 1) or BFo(g) will reach a minimum above the chosen level γ.
In both cases the sufficiently sceptical relative prior variance gγ is not defined since there is
no need to challenge an already “unconvincing” result.
It can be shown (see Appendix A for details) that gγ can be explicitly computed by
gγ =
−
z2o
q
− 1 if − z
2
o
q
≥ 1
undefined else
(2)
where q = W−1
(
− z
2
o
γ2
· exp {−z2o})
where W−1(·) is the branch of the Lambert W function (Corless et al., 1996) that satisfies
W(y) ≤ −1 for y ∈ [−e−1, 0). The Lambert W function is defined as the function satisfying
W(y) · exp{W(y)} = y and is also known as “product logarithm“ since it returns the number
which plugged in the exponential function and then multiplied by itself produces y. For real
y, W(y) is only defined for y ≥ −e−1 and for y ∈ [−e−1, 0) the function has two branches that
are commonly denoted by W0(·), the branch with W(y) ≥ −1, and W−1(·), the branch with
W(y) ≤ −1 (see Figure 2 for an illustration).
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
− e−1− 1 0 1 2 3
y
W
(y)
Branch
W
−1
W0 
Figure 2: Lambert W function for real argument y.
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The fact that the Lambert W function is only defined for arguments equal to or larger than
−e−1 implies that a further condition for the existence of the sufficiently sceptical relative
prior variance gγ is
− z
2
o
γ2
· exp {−z2o} ≥ −e−1. (3)
Because z2o ≥ 0 and γ > 0, the left-hand side of (3) is either negative (for |zo| > 0) or zero
(for zo = 0). This in turn implies that if the sufficiently sceptical relative prior variance gγ
exists and zo is not zero, there is always a second solution arising from W0(·), the branch of
the Lambert W function which is greater than −1. This second solution corresponds to the
relative prior variance g′γ > g that leads to BFo(g′γ) = γ because of the Jeffreys-Lindley’s
paradox. Following some algebraic manipulations, we can also see that for |zo| ≥ 1, equation
(3) is equivalent to
|zo| · exp
{−z2o/2} · √e = BFo ≤ γ,
the obvious condition that the lower bound BFo of BFo(g) needs to be smaller or equal to the
chosen level γ for the sufficiently sceptical relative prior variance gγ to exist.
2.5 Data from the replication study
In a second step, a replication study is conducted and a new effect estimate θˆr is obtained. In
light of the new data, the sceptic is now challenged by an advocate of the original finding. To
incorporate this, we consider BFr(g), the BF for the effect estimate from the replication θˆr | θ ∼
N(θ, σ2r ) comparing the hypothesis HS : θ ∼ N(0, g · σ2o ) to the alternative HA : θ ∼ N(θˆo, σ2o )
as a function of the relative sceptical prior variance g for fixed θˆo and θˆr. HS in this case
reflects the view of the sceptic whereas the view of an advocate is represented by HA since this is
the posterior of θ given the original estimate and a uniform prior (also the reference prior for
this model).
This is not the only reasonable hypothesis that could represent the advocate; we could also
restrict the alternative such that only effects in the same direction as θˆo have non-zero prob-
ability, e. g. for positive θˆo consider HA′ : θ ∼ N(θˆo, σ2o ) 1[0,∞)(θ), where 1B(x) is the indicator
function that x is in the set B. If the replication effect estimate goes in the other direction than
the original one, it is still possible to arrive at the conclusion that the data favour HA over HS
(so-called “replication-paradox” (Ly et al., 2018)) with HA, whereas this impossible under HA′ .
However, assigning zero probability to effects that go in the other direct violates Cromwell’s
rule and may hide the fact that the effect actually goes in the opposite direction which is not
unlikely if the original estimate is small and estimated imprecisely. Whether or not HA or
HA′ should be chosen is a philosophical question and we will focus on HA in this paper for
technical simplicity.
Similarly as BFo(g) from (1), BFr(g) depends on zo and the relative sceptical prior variance
g, but also on zr and the relative variance c = σ2o /σ2r , i. e.
BFr(g) ≡ BFS:A(θˆr; g) =
√
1+ c
1+ cg
· exp
{
−1
2
(
z2r
1+ cg
−
(
zr − zo
√
c
)2
1+ c
)}
. (4)
If the BF from (4) evaluated at the sufficiently sceptical relative prior variance gγ is not larger
than the corresponding level γ
BFr(gγ) ≤ γ,
the replication data are at least 1/γ times better predicted by the advocate than by the sceptic.
Thus, the sceptic’s objection is rendered unrealistic and we declare replication success at level
γ.
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For example, if we observe zo = 3 (equivalent to a two-sided p-value of 0.003) and choose
a level γ = 1/10, using equation (2), the sufficiently sceptical relative prior variance is gγ ≈
1.6. If a replication is conducted with the same precision (c = 1) and we observe zr = 2.5
(equivalent to a two-sided p-value of 0.012), using equation (4) this would lead to BFr(1.6) ≈
1/3.5, which means that the replication was not successful at level γ = 1/10. However, if we
had chosen a higher level, e. g. γ = 1/3, the replication would have been considered successful
since then gγ ≈ 0.4 and BFr(0.4) ≈ 1/7.4.
2.6 The sceptical Bayes factor
Apart from specifying a level γ, this procedure offers an automated way to assess replication
success. However, it is unclear which level γ should be chosen for several reasons: There are
well established classifications of Bayes factors (see e. g. Held and Ott (2018) for an overview),
yet they are all still arbitrary and it is unclear whether they can be applied to the reverse-Bayes
approach considered here. Moreover, the sufficiently sceptical relative prior variance gγ does
not exist for levels γ that are below the lower bound BFo. Finally, a quantitative definition of
replication success would be preferred to an arbitrary dichotomisation.
BFS =  1
BFS =  1
BFS =  1 1.2
BFS =  1 1.2
BFS =  1 1.5
BFS =  1 4
zo =  0.5 zo =  1.5 zo =  2.5
z
r
=
 0.5
z
r
=
 1.5
z
r
=
 2.5
0 3 10 30 100 300 0 3 10 30 100 300 0 3 10 30 100 300
10
1
1/10
10
1
1/10
10
1
1/10
Relative sceptical prior variance g
B
F(
g) BFo
BFr
Figure 3: BFr(·) and BFo(·) as a function of g. In all examples c = 1. Maxima for BFr and
minima for BFo are indicated by dots (•), BFS indicated by crosses (×) where defined.
It seems more sensible to eliminate this arbitrariness by finding the smallest level for which
the replication is still considered to be successful, similar to minimum Bayes factors (Berger
and Sellke, 1987; Held and Ott, 2018). We thus define the sceptical Bayes factor BFS as the
smallest level where replication success can be declared. Since we want to avoid that this
level is attained at an unreasonably large relative sceptical prior variance g due to the Jeffreys-
Lindley’s paradox, we further restrict the range of g over which the minimisation takes place
to be the interval between zero and g = max
{
z2o − 1, 0
}
. The sceptical Bayes factor is hence
given by
BFS ≡ inf
gγ∈[0,g]
{
γ : BFr(gγ) ≤ γ
}
. (5)
Figure 3 shows BFr(·) and BFo(·) over a grid of g values for several scenarios of zo and zr
along with the corresponding BFS. As can be seen in the upper three plots, there are situations
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when either zo, zr, or both are so small that replication success cannot be established for any
g ∈ [0, g] and hence BFS does not exist. This means that the replication was unsuccessful since
it is impossible for the advocate to convince the sceptic at any level of evidence. Moreover, by
construction BFS cannot be larger than one and smaller than BFo. This implies that if |zo| ≤ 1,
replication success can only be achieved at γ = 1 (the middle and bottom plots on the left),
while for |zo| > 1 it can be achieved at most at the lower bound BFo = |zo| · exp(−z2o/2) ·
√
e
(the middle and bottom plots in the centre). Finally, in a typical situation when zo and zr are
both reasonably large, BFS is located at the intersection BFr(gγ) = BFo(gγ) in gγ ∈ [0, g] (the
middle and bottom plots on the right).
There is no closed form expression for the computation of the sceptical Bayes factor in the
general case (see Appendix B for details). However, it is worth noting that for the special case
when the replication is conducted with the same precision as the original study (c = 1), the
g∗ at which BFr(·) and BFo(·) intersect can be explicitly computed using again the Lambert W
function:
g∗ =

−z2A
W(−x) − 1 if
−z2A
W(−x) ≥ 1
undefined else
(6)
with x =
z2A√
2
· exp
{
− z
2
o
2
(
1+
(1− d)2
2
)}
where z2A = (z
2
o + z2r )/2 is the arithmetic mean of the squared z-statistics and d = θˆr/θˆo is the
relative effect estimate. Since z2o , z2r ≥ 0 it must also hold that x ≥ 0 and therefore W(−x) has
two solutions whenever x < e−1 and at least one of zo, zr is non-zero. Moreover, we can see
that the existence of the solutions (whether or not x < e−1) depends on two things: First, the
size of the squared z-statistics z2o and z2r which increase with increasing evidence for non-null
effects in original and replication study, respectively. Second, on the squared relative effect
estimate d2 which is a measure for the compatibility of both effect estimates.
Assuming now that c = 1, that zo and zr are large enough such that the sceptical Bayes
factor is located at the intersection of BFo(·) and BFr(·), and that the sufficiently sceptical
relative prior variance gγ is obtained as the solution from the W−1(−x) branch in equation (6),
BFS is given by
BFS = BFo(g∗) =
√
−z2A
W−1(−x) · exp
{
− z
2
o
2
}
· exp
{
−W−1(−x)
d2 + 1
}
.
2.7 Connection to other measures of replication success
Of interest is also the relationship between BFS and other measures of replication success.
We note that the lower bound BFo is simply a rescaling of the original p-value, po = 2 · {1−
Φ(|zo|)}, where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribu-
tion, and it will indicate more evidence against the null for decreasing p-values (BFo ↓ 0 as
po ↓ 0). Thus to achieve replication success at a compelling level, the original result needs to be
convincing on its own as it also determines the lower bound of the sceptical Bayes factor (since
BFS ∈ [BFo, 1]). Similarly, for compatible estimates (θˆo ≈ θˆr) and fixed g and c, BFS:A(θˆr) as
given by (4) will decrease as the replication p-value pr = 2 · {1−Φ(|zr|)} decreases. For fixed
θˆr and with increasing incompatibility of the estimates, BFS:A(θˆr) will increase and provide
evidence for the sceptic, i. e. BFS:A(θˆr)→ ∞ for Q→ ∞, with Q = (θˆo − θˆr)2/(σ2o + σ2r ). Hence,
for BFS:A(θˆr; gγ) to be smaller than the corresponding level γ, the replication result needs not
only to be convincing on its own, but also compatible with the original result such that repli-
cation success can be established at a compelling level. In this way, the proposed method
elegantly combines traditional notions of replication success; it ensures that both studies need
to show evidence against the null, similar to the “vote-counting” approach that requires both
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original and replication study to be statistically significant, while at the same time penalising
incompatibility of their effect estimates, similar to assessing compatibility with a Q-test or
prediction intervals.
Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014) proposed a related quantity to assess replication suc-
cess, the “replication Bayes factor” BFR. It is defined as the BF comparing the point null
hypothesis H0 : θ = 0, to the alternative that the effect is distributed according to the posterior
distribution of θ after observing the original data. For the normal model considered in this
paper and if a uniform initial prior was chosen, this alternative is also the hypothesis of the
advocate considered earlier, i. e. HA : θ ∼ N(θˆo, σ2o ), and therefore BFR is given by
BFR ≡ BF0:A(θˆr) =
√
1+ c · exp
{
−1
2
(
z2r −
(
zr − zo
√
c
)2
1+ c
)}
.
It is clear that BFr(g) → BFR as g ↓ 0 and BFr(g) can thus be considered an extension of the
replication Bayes factor where the likelihood under the point null hypothesis is replaced by
the marginal likelihood under the sufficiently sceptical prior. Furthermore, while BFR shares
the properties with BFS that it decreases with decreasing replication p-value pr and that it in-
creases with increasing conflict of the estimates Q, it does not depend directly on how much
evidence the original study provides against the null. Thus if the effect estimates are com-
patible, BFR can also indicate a large degree of replication success for unconvincing original
studies, whereas this is impossible for BFS which requires both studies to be convincing on
their own. Additionally, if the replication result was so unconvincing such that BFS does not
exist, BFR can also quantify to which extent the replication data favour the null.
Of particular interest is the relationship between the sceptical Bayes factor and the sceptical
p-value pS (Held, 2020b), as pS is the result of a similar reverse-Bayes procedure. One also
considers a sceptical prior for the effect θ ∼ N(0, τ2), the sufficiently sceptical prior variance
at level α is then defined as τ2 = τ2α such that the (1− α) credible interval for θ based on the
posterior θ | θˆo, τ2α does not include zero. Replication success is declared if the tail probability
of the replication effect estimate under its prior predictive distribution θˆr | τ2α ∼ N(0, τ2α + σ2r )
is smaller than α. The smallest level α where replication success can be established defines
pS. In contrast to BFS, pS always exists and can be easily computed using only the variance
ratio c, the arithmetic and the harmonic mean of the squared z-statistics. Similar to BFS, the
property that pS ≥ max{po, pr} (Held, 2020b, Section 3.1) ensures that both studies need to
be convincing on their own. However, while pS measures compatibility between the estimates
only indirectly through conflict with the sceptical prior, BFS directly evaluates how likely the
replication data are to occur under the posterior of the effect conditional on the original data.
Figure 4 shows BFS, BFR, and pS in a raster plot for a grid of zo and zr and with c = 1. In
regions where zo and zr are similar, BFR has lower values compared to BFS (e. g. if zo = 3 and
zr = 2.5, BFR = 1/15 and BFS = 1/5.2). They only coincide when BFR = 1 (e. g. if zo = 3 and
zr = 1.4), which is (for any c) at the hyperbola fulfilling
zr =
−zo√
c
±
√
(1+ c){log(1+ c) + z2o},
indicated by the dashed green lines in the left and middle panels. In regions where zo and
zr differ by a large amount, BFR has values greater than one, indicating that the replication
data favour the null hypothesis (e. g. if zo = 2 and zr = −2, BFR = 10), whereas BFS does
not exist. For original findings which were only suggestive (i. e. |zo| is small), it is impossible
to achieve replication success at a reasonable level with BFS and pS, even though the result
from the replication would be very convincing on its own. In contrast, BFR can indicate a
large degree of replication success, provided that the replication result is compatible with the
original result (e. g. BFR = 1/222 for zo = 1 and zr = 5, whereas BFS = 1, pS = 0.17). Note, that
the replication-paradox occurs for BFR for some of the values shown in Figure 4, e. g. if zo = −1
and zr = 4.5, BFR = 1/9.2 provides strong evidence against the null, although the signs of
the estimates differ, whereas BFS = 1 indicates no replication success. However, in some very
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Figure 4: Raster plot of replication Bayes factor BFR, the sceptical Bayes factor BFS, and the
one-sided sceptical p-value pS as function of zr and zo for variance ratio c = σ2o /σ2r = 1. A
grey cell means that BFS is not defined for the corresponding values of zr and zo.
extreme scenarios it is also possible that the replication paradox occurs for BFS, e. g. if zo = 10
and zr = −30 then BFS = 1/137. It seems that BFS is more robust to the replication-paradox
than BFR since the replication data are evaluated under the composite null hypothesis HS
rather than the precise null hypothesis H0. Nevertheless, the replication-paradox can only be
completely avoided when restrictions on the parameter space are imposed such as discussed
in Section 2.5. We can further see that when c = 1, pS treats zr and zo as exchangeable, whereas
this is not the case for BFR and BFS. For instance, zo = 2 and zr = 3 or z′o = 3 and z′r = 2 both
lead to pS = 0.048, while BFS = 1/2.2 and BFR = 1/50 for the former and BFS = 1/2.8 and
BFR = 1/4.1 for the latter. Finally, we can see that in scenarios where the replication effect
estimate goes in the same direction but with smaller magnitude than the original estimate,
BFS reacts more sensitively to incompatibility than pS, e. g. if zo = 4.5 and zr = 2, which for
c = 1 is equivalent to a relative effect estimate of d = θˆr/θˆo = 0.44, we obtain BFS = 1/1.1,
whereas pS = 0.034.
2.8 Distribution under the null
The distribution of BFS can be easily approximated with stochastic simulation. Of particular
interest is the distribution under the null hypothesis when the underlying effect is zero. Figure
5 shows the percentage of simulations for which BFS was smaller than one, equal to one, or
undefined (A) and density estimates of the null distribution of BFS (B), pS (C), and BFR (D).
The truncation of the distribution of BFS was chosen because it allows for easier comparison
of the distributions below one for different values of c. We see that with increasing precision
of the replication study (i. e. larger c), the mass of the distributions of BFS and pS shifts further
towards one and a half, respectively, while the distribution of BFR shifts further towards
values above one. Similarly, the proportion of BFS smaller than one decreases, e. g. it is 8%
for c = 1/4, 6% for c = 1, and only 2% for c = 4. The proportion of BFS equal to one also
decreases, whereas the proportion of undefined BFS increases with increasing c. Thus for all
three methods the risk of wrongly claiming replication success decreases when the precision
of the replication effect estimate is increased.
Simulation under the null can also be used to calibrate BFS, similar to the approach sug-
gested in Vlachos and Gelfand (2003). For a given variance ratio c, we can determine the
threshold for replication success γS such that α = Pr(BFS < γS |H0), the probability for in-
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Figure 5: Distribution of BFS (B), pS (C), and BFR (D) obtained from 105 simulations under the
null hypothesis for different values of the variance ratio c. The distribution of BFS is truncated
and shows only values smaller than one. Plot (A) shows the percentage of simulations in
which BFS was smaller than one, equal to one, or undefined.
correctly claiming replication success (type I error) is low. For example, if we set c = 1 and
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Figure 6: Empirical type I errors of replication Bayes factor (BFR), sceptical Bayes factor (BFS),
and one-sided sceptical p-value (pS) as a function of the threshold below which replication
success is declared, obtained from 106 simulations under the null hypothesis for variance
ratio c = 1.
want to control the type I error at α = 0.05× 0.025 = 0.00125 (the conventional level for type I
error control of two independent experiments with two-sided testing in the first and one-sided
testing in the second), the threshold turns out to be γS = 1/2.4. Type I error calibration of BFS
as well as BFR and pS is shown in Figure 6. Note, that for c = 1 the null distribution of pS is
known (Held, 2020a) and simulation would not be needed for type I error calibration of this
method.
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Figure 7: Power as a function of c for sceptical Bayes factor (BFS), one-sided sceptical p-value
(pS), and replication Bayes factor (BFR) to achieve replication success based on type I error with
α = 0.05× 0.025 = 0.00125 calibrated thresholds (Figure 6). Power of BFS was computed from
104 simulations under the alternative hypothesis that zr | θ = θˆo ∼ N(zo
√
c, 1) (conditional)
and zr | θˆo ∼ N(zo
√
c, 1+ c) (predictive), while it was computed numerically for pS and BFR.
2.9 Distribution under the alternative
A further operating characteristic of BFS that can be studied is the probability that replication
success is established given that the alternative is true (power) using the type I error calibrated
threshold. We consider two types here: the power is either computed assuming that the
underlying true effect corresponds to its estimate from the original study (conditional power)
or the power is computed under the posterior predictive distribution of the replication effect
estimate (predictive power) (Spiegelhalter et al., 1986; Weiss, 1997; Micheloud and Held, 2020).
Figure 7 shows conditional and predictive power of BFS, BFR, and pS as a function of the
variance ratio c and for several values of zo. In general, uncertainty about replication success
is higher for predictive power, leading it to be closer to 50% in all cases. As can also be seen, if
the original result was not convincing on its own (e. g. if zo = 1.75), it is impossible to achieve
replication success with the reverse-Bayes methods BFS and pS, leading to low or zero power
(conditional and predictive). This is not the case for BFR, for which high power can also be
obtained for small zo if c is sufficiently large. For larger zo and small to medium c, on the
other hand, BFS and pS show power gains compared to BFR. For example for zo = 2.75 and
c < 3 the power of BFS and pS is substantially larger compared to BFR, while it is similar
for c ≥ 3. In conclusion, the reverse-Bayes methods seem to be advantageous compared to
BFR if the original finding was already convincing on its own and the estimation precision in
the replication is not much higher than in the original study. For higher precision, the power
differences between the methods disappear.
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3 Applications
3.1 Reproducibility Project: Cancer Biology
We first examine two examples from the Reproducibility Project: Cancer Biology (Errington et al.,
2014). The first example concerns the replication of Ward et al. (2010), where one of the find-
ings was that samples from patients with acute myeloid leukaemia showed an increased level
of the oncometabolite 2HG/glutamate when they showed a certain mutation (IDH1/IDH2)
compared to samples without this mutation (standardised mean difference SMD = 4.36 with
95% confidence interval [2.62, 6.09]). The replication study (Showalter et al., 2017) estimated
the effect of the mutation to be slightly smaller (standardised mean difference SMD = 3.09
with 95% confidence interval [1.35, 4.80]), however, the meta-analytic Q-test does not indicate
incompatibility of the effect estimates (pQ = 0.31).
Plots A and B in Figure 8 show the results of our analysis of this study. Note that the
standard errors of the SMD effect estimates were computed by dividing the difference between
the confidence interval limits by twice the 97.5% quantile of the standard normal distribution.
We obtain a replication Bayes factor of BFR = 1/200, a one-sided sceptical p-value of pS =
0.002, and a sceptical Bayes factor of BFS = 1/35. Thus all methods indicate that the original
finding was replicated to a high degree in this case.
The second example is the replication of Delmore et al. (2011). One of the investigations
in this study was a comparison of the survival of mice which were treated with the drug
JQ1 versus mice in a control group that received no treatment. The original study (Delmore
et al., 2011) estimated a hazard ratio of HR = 25.93 with 95% confidence interval from 5.48
to 122.58, whereas the replication (Aird et al., 2017) resulted in an estimated hazard ratio of
HR = 3.75 with 95% confidence interval from 1.19 to 11.81. Although both effect estimates
are significantly different from zero (at the conventional 5% level), their sizes differ by an
order of magnitude and the meta-analytic Q-test provides some evidence for incompatibility
(pQ = 0.05).
Plots C and D in Figure 8 show the results of our analysis of the Aird et al. (2017) data. The
HRs were first log-transformed, resulting in approximate normality. The standard errors of
the logHRs were computed by dividing the difference between the log-transformed confidence
interval limits by twice the 97.5% quantile of the standard normal distribution. The replication
Bayes factor then turns out to be BFR = 1/1.1, indicating that the replication data are almost
equally likely predicted by either the null hypothesis or the posterior of the effect from the
original study. Similarly, the sceptical Bayes factor is BFS = 1/1.1 which suggests that the
replication data are not compelling enough that replication success can be established at a
reasonable level. The one-sided sceptical p-value, on the other hand, is pS = 0.031, indicating
some conflict between the sceptical prior and the observed data from the replication. This
highlights an important difference between the two approaches: Bayes factors allow for direct
quantification of evidence for one hypothesis versus another, whereas p-values can do so only
indirectly. Thus, even though the replication data in Aird et al. (2017) are unlikely under the
sceptical prior, they are also very unlikely under the advocacy prior, and therefore a reverse-
Bayes analysis using Bayes factors leads to a different conclusion than an analysis based on
p-values.
3.2 Social Sciences Replication Project
Next, we consider the data from the Social Sciences Replication Project (Camerer et al., 2018),
provided in Table 2. The effect estimates were given as correlations (r) in all cases. Appli-
cation of the Fisher z-transformation, θˆ = tanh−1(r), leads to approximate normality with
the variance of the transformed estimates being a simple function of the sample size n, i. e.
Var(θˆ) = 1/(n− 3) (Fisher, 1921). The replication Bayes factors under normality agree reason-
ably well with the ones reported in the supplement of Camerer et al. (2018) where the Bayesian
analysis is described (see https://osf.io/nsxgj/), despite that one-sided alternatives and
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Figure 8: Examples taken from Showalter et al. (2017) (above) and Aird et al. (2017) (below).
Plots A and C show a standard Bayesian analysis of the data from the replication study
with a prior corresponding to the posterior from the original study and 95% credible interval
indicated at the top of the plots. Plots B and D show a reverse-Bayes analysis of both studies,
BFS is indicated by a cross (×).
Table 2: Results for data from Social Sciences Replication Project (Camerer et al., 2018). Confi-
dence intervals for individual effects were computed on Fisher z-scale and back-transformed
to correlation scale (r). The p-values po, pr, pS are one-sided (in the direction of the original
estimate), and pQ is the p-value from the Q-test assessing the differences between the effect
estimates.
Original study ro [95% CI] rr [95% CI] po pr pQ pS BFS BFR
Hauser et al. (2014) 0.82 [0.68, 0.90] 0.83 [0.63, 0.93] < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.86 < 0.0001 < 1/1000 < 1/1000
Aviezer et al. (2012) 0.96 [0.88, 0.99] 0.83 [0.53, 0.94] < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.062 0.0003 1/78 1/284
Wilson et al. (2014) 0.67 [0.41, 0.83] 0.59 [0.34, 0.77] < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.60 0.002 1/45 < 1/1000
Derex et al. (2013) 0.52 [0.29, 0.70] 0.36 [0.13, 0.56] < 0.0001 0.001 0.29 0.01 1/8.5 1/31
Gneezy et al. (2014) 0.22 [0.08, 0.36] 0.18 [0.09, 0.27] 0.001 0.0001 0.64 0.019 1/6.9 1/474
Karpicke and Blunt (2011) 0.60 [0.36, 0.77] 0.38 [0.12, 0.60] < 0.0001 0.003 0.19 0.012 1/5.6 1/12
Morewedge et al. (2010) 0.45 [0.12, 0.69] 0.35 [0.16, 0.52] 0.004 0.0003 0.58 0.036 1/3.9 1/160
Kovacs et al. (2010) 0.45 [0.06, 0.72] 0.59 [0.44, 0.70] 0.013 < 0.0001 0.44 0.03 1/3.2 < 1/1000
Duncan et al. (2012) 0.67 [0.25, 0.88] 0.44 [0.25, 0.59] 0.002 < 0.0001 0.26 0.036 1/3.1 < 1/1000
Nishi et al. (2015) 0.20 [0.06, 0.33] 0.12 [0.03, 0.20] 0.002 0.005 0.31 0.046 1/2.5 1/8.2
Janssen et al. (2010) 0.63 [0.45, 0.76] 0.34 [0.04, 0.59] < 0.0001 0.013 0.061 0.017 1/1.6 1/1.6
Balafoutas and Sutter (2012) 0.28 [0.05, 0.48] 0.15 [0.02, 0.27] 0.009 0.011 0.31 0.085 1/1.6 1/3.9
Pyc and Rawson (2010) 0.38 [0.05, 0.63] 0.15 [0.04, 0.26] 0.011 0.004 0.18 0.11 1/1.2 1/4
Rand et al. (2012) 0.14 [0.04, 0.24] 0.03 [-0.02, 0.07] 0.004 0.12 0.047 0.19 9.6
Ackerman et al. (2010) 0.27 [0.00, 0.50] 0.06 [-0.02, 0.14] 0.024 0.063 0.14 0.21 3.2
Sparrow et al. (2011) 0.37 [0.14, 0.56] 0.05 [-0.08, 0.18] 0.0009 0.23 0.016 0.24 29
Shah et al. (2012) 0.27 [0.00, 0.50] -0.02 [-0.09, 0.06] 0.023 0.65 0.043 0.63 25
Kidd and Castano (2013) 0.27 [0.06, 0.46] -0.03 [-0.10, 0.05] 0.006 0.77 0.009 0.72 72
Gervais and Norenzayan (2012) 0.29 [0.03, 0.51] -0.04 [-0.12, 0.05] 0.014 0.79 0.02 0.73 36
Lee and Schwarz (2010) 0.39 [0.09, 0.62] -0.05 [-0.16, 0.07] 0.006 0.78 0.009 0.74 65
Ramirez and Beilock (2011) 0.79 [0.54, 0.91] -0.10 [-0.31, 0.13] < 0.0001 0.80 < 0.0001 0.79 > 1000
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initial Cauchy priors were used, as well as computations were performed with summaries of
the raw data rather than effect estimates transformed to correlations. There are two notable
exceptions: The study by Janssen et al. (2010), where the reported analysis indicates over-
whelming evidence for the null compared to the advocate (BFR > 1000), while our computed
BFR provides inconclusive evidence (BFR = 1/1.6), and the study by Derex et al. (2013) where
the reported analysis indicates overwhelming evidence for the advocate compared to the null
(BFR < 1/1000), while our computed BFR provides only strong evidence (BFR = 1/31). In
both cases non-standard analyses were carried out, i. e. a Bayesian Mann-Whitney test for the
former and an encompassing prior approach for the latter. We therefore advise to interpret
our results in these cases as numerical examples rather than as definitive answers about the
replicability of these two studies.
For the study pairs where BFS suggests strong replication success, pS and BFR suggest the
same in every case. However, there are also study pairs where there appears to be disagree-
ment among the methods. Discrepancies between pS and BFS usually happen in situations
where the replication shows an effect estimate that, although incompatible with the sceptic, is
also incompatible with the advocate. For example in the Janssen et al. (2010) replication, both
effect estimates are substantially larger than zero (ro = 0.63 with po < 0.0001 and rr = 0.34
with pr = 0.013), yet the Q-test provides some evidence for their incompatibility (pQ = 0.061),
which explains why pS = 0.017, but BFS = 1/1.6 only.
Discrepancies between BFR and BFS can arise when the replication finding provides over-
whelming evidence against the null, whereas the original finding was less compelling. An
example which illustrates this situation is the replication of Kovacs et al. (2010). The orig-
inal study provided only moderate evidence against the null (po = 0.013 or equivalently
BFo = 1/3.2), whereas the replication finding was more compelling (pr < 0.0001). By con-
struction BFS can only be as small as BFo which happens in this case (BFS = 1/3.2). This
means that the original finding was substantiated at the highest level of evidence possible.
The BFR, on the other hand, is not limited by the moderate level of evidence from the original
study and indicates decisive evidence for the advocate (BFR < 1/1000) as there is no evidence
for conflict of the effect estimates (pQ = 0.44). This illustrates that in order to achieve a reason-
able degree of replication success, BFS requires both studies to be convincing on their own,
whereas BFR only requires a compelling replication result provided that both estimates are
compatible.
4 Discussion
We presented a novel reverse-Bayes method for the statistical analysis of replication studies.
The method consists of a two-step procedure that naturally fits the replication setting: First, we
determine a prior distribution for the unknown effect such that the original result is no longer
convincing in terms of its Bayes factor. This prior represents the view of a sceptic who does
not believe in the original claim. In the second step, the sceptic is challenged by an advocate
of the original finding. This is operationalised by a Bayes factor for the replication effect
estimate that contrasts the sceptical prior to the posterior of the effect based on the original
result when a uniform initial prior was chosen. If this second Bayes factor indicates that the
data favour the advocate over the sceptic at a higher level than the sceptic’s objection from
step one, the advocate managed to convince the sceptic about the credibility of the original
claim and we declare replication success. To remove the dependence on choosing the Bayes
factor level at which the original finding is no longer convincing, we determine the highest
level where replication success can still be declared and denote this the sceptical Bayes factor.
The sceptical Bayes factor is thus an extension of the sceptical p-value (Held, 2020b) to
the Bayesian hypothesis testing framework. In contrast to the sceptical p-value, closed form
expressions are only available when certain conditions are met (when original and replica-
tion effect estimates are sufficiently large and have the same variance), otherwise numerical
root-finding algorithms must be used. While the sceptical p-value always exists, BFS does
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not. This happens when the result of the replication is so inconclusive that a sceptic of the
original finding cannot be convinced at any level of evidence. While the sceptical p-value only
quantifies the conflict between the sceptical prior and the observed replication data, the BFS
also takes into account how likely the replication data are under the advocacy prior, which is
the posterior of the effect conditional on the original finding and a uniform prior. Hence, in
cases where the replication estimate goes in the same direction but with much smaller mag-
nitude, the sceptical p-value might still indicate some replication success, while BFS would
indicate less replication success since the data are also unlikely under the advocacy prior (see
the example from Aird et al. (2017) in Section 3.2). In the (rare) scenario where there is in-
compatibility because the replication estimate goes in the same direction but with much larger
magnitude, pS will indicate a higher degree of replication success than if there was no conflict,
whereas BFS will not. The direct evaluation of the compatibility therefore allows for stronger
statements about the degree of replication success compared to pS.
We compared BFS to the replication Bayes factor BFR (Verhagen and Wagenmakers, 2014),
which quantifies how likely the replication data are under a point null hypothesis compared
to the posterior of the effect based on the original study. Similar to BFS, the BFR takes into
account whether the effect estimates from original and replication study are compatible as
well as whether the replication finding shows evidence against the null. In contrast to BFS,
BFR does not require the original finding to be compelling on its own. The BFR can be con-
sidered standard forward-Bayes evidence updating tailored to the replication setting. The
nature of BFS, on the other hand, lies not in evidence synthesis but rather in challenging and
substantiation of an original finding through a reverse-Bayes argument.
The presented approach also comes with some limitations and could be extended in many
ways. First, BFS cannot be interpreted as a standard Bayes factor. We have presented a
way to calibrate BFS through type I error control, yet future work is required to explore
other calibration approaches that allow for a more quantitative interpretation. Second, the
set of effect estimates for which replication success is achieved at a specified level could be
determined, similar to the concept of the ”support interval” (Wagenmakers et al., 2020). Such a
set could give a better idea about which effect estimates would have been able to substantiate
the original claim at a specified level. Third, in many cases we might be interested in the
direction of the effect and the replication setting is no exception since usually the goal is
to replicate an effect in the same direction as in the original study. As already discussed,
our approach could also be modified to work in this case by imposing restrictions on the
parameters under the hypothesis of the advocate. Fourth, in many case not just one but several
replication studies are conducted for one original study (e. g. as in Klein et al., 2014). The
Bayesian framework allows us to easily extend BFS to the “many-to-one” replication setting as
the marginal likelihoods in BFR are also straightforward to compute for a sample of replication
effect estimates. Finally, a multivariate generalisation would allow for effects in the form of
random vectors with approximate multivariate normal likelihood which is then combined
with a sceptical g-prior (Liang et al., 2008). The normal prior could also be replaced with other
distributions, for example the (multivariate) Cauchy distribution which is often the preferred
prior choice for default Bayes factor hypothesis tests (Jeffreys, 1961). The g parameter of the
g-prior or the scale parameter of the Cauchy prior would then take over the role of the relative
sceptical prior variance.
An important aspect that has not been discussed so far is the design of new replication
studies. An appropriate sample size is of particular importance for a replication to be mean-
ingful. For sample size determination related to Bayesian hypothesis testing and the normal-
normal model, there exist theoretical results that could be used for our purpose (see Weiss,
1997; De Santis, 2004). A more general strategy is to use stochastic simulation (Schönbrodt
and Wagenmakers, 2017). Typically a design prior (O'Hagan et al., 2001) is used rather than the
prior used in the final analysis. The design prior should reflect the researchers’ best knowl-
edge of the effect under investigation to facilitate efficient design. Then the sample size is
determined such that the prior predictive distribution of the replication effect estimate results
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in a BFS below a specified cut-off with desired probability (e. g. 80%). The “relative cut-off”
approach of Weiss (1997) could also be used. Instead of specifying a cut-off value, the desired
type I error is specified which then determines the cut-off and the sample size such that the
type I error is controlled under the null and the power is attained under the alternative. Fu-
ture work is required to investigate in further detail the issue of sample size planning based
on BFS.
Hypothesis testing is, however, only one side of the coin and we should not forget param-
eter estimation. Especially in the Bayesian framework, estimation-based approaches for the
evaluation of replication studies are still underdeveloped, future research should also focus
on these aspects. For a thorough assessment of replication attempts, no single metric seems
to be able to answer all important questions completely. Instead, we recommend that re-
searchers conduct a comprehensive statistical evaluation of replication success. We advocate
the reverse-Bayes approach as a key part of such analyses, as it provides a conceptually sound
way to challenge and substantiate an original finding, which combines traditional notions of
replication success.
Software and data
All analyses were performed in the R programming language version 4.0.2 (R Core Team,
2020). The code to reproduce this manuscript is available at https://gitlab.uzh.ch/samuel.
pawel/BFScode. We used the implementation of the Lambert W function from the package
lamW (Adler, 2015), graphics were created with the ggplot2 package (Wickham, 2016), the scep-
tical p-value and related power calculations were computed using the package ReplicationSuccess
downloaded from https://r-forge.r-project.org/projects/replication/ (Held, 2020b).
All methods are implemented in the R package BayesRep of which the development version is
available at https://gitlab.uzh.ch/samuel.pawel/BayesRep. We plan to make the package
available on CRAN in the future.
Data from the Social Sciences Replication Project (Camerer et al., 2018) were downloaded
from https://osf.io/abu7k/. Data for the two examples from the Reproducibility Project:
Cancer Biology (Errington et al., 2014) were extracted from the forest-plots in Figure 4 and
Figure 4B in Showalter et al. (2017) and Aird et al. (2017), respectively.
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Appendices
A Sufficiently sceptical relative prior variance
The sufficiently sceptical relative prior variance at level γ is the value gγ ∈ [0, g] that fulfils
the condition
BFo(gγ) = γ. (7)
Substituting and rearranging terms in (7), we obtain√
1+ gγ · exp
{
−1
2
· gγ
1+ gγ
· z2o
}
= γ
⇐⇒ 1
γ
· exp
{
− z
2
o
2
}
=
1√
1+ gγ
exp
{
−1
2
· z
2
o
1+ gγ
}
.
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Squaring both sides and multiplying by −z2o , this becomes
⇐⇒ − z
2
o
γ2
· exp {−z2o} = − z2o1+ gγ exp
{
− z
2
o
1+ gγ
}
. (8)
This is a transcendental equation that cannot be explicitly solved in terms of elementary func-
tions. However, if we set q = −z2o/(1+ gγ) then (8) becomes
− z
2
o
γ2
· exp {−z2o} = q · exp {q} .
The solution for q (and consequently for gγ) can be explicitly computed using the Lambert W
function (Corless et al., 1996) which is available in standard numerical software
q = W
(
− z
2
o
γ2
· exp {−z2o})
gγ =
−
z2o
q
− 1 if − z
2
o
q
≥ 1
undefined else
(9)
For some zo, equation (8) can also be satisfied for negative gγ, which is why we need to add
the condition −z2o/q ≥ 1 in equation (9), such that gγ is a valid relative variance. Note that
the Lambert W function is a multivalued function. Specifically, for real arguments, the two
branches W0 and W−1 can be distinguished. Applying W−1 in our case returns gγ ∈ [0, g] that
fulfils (7), while W0 returns g′γ ∈ [g,∞) that fulfils (7) due to the Jeffreys-Lindley’s paradox.
B Computation of the sceptical Bayes factor
From the definition of the sceptical Bayes factor
BFS ≡ inf
gγ∈[0,g]
{
γ : BFr(gγ) ≤ γ
}
,
it is apparent that BFS is either
1. undefined, if BFr(g) > BFo(g) for all g ∈ [0, g]
2. BFS = BFo, if BFr(g) < BFo
3. BFS = infgγ∈[0,g] {γ : BFr(gγ) = γ}, the height of the lowest intersection of BFo(·) and
BFr(·) in gγ ∈ [0, g] otherwise
Whether BFS attains the lower bound BFo (condition 2) can be checked by evaluating if
BFr(g) ≥ BFo and setting BFS = BFo if it is the case.
For condition 3, we know that the intersections between BFo(·) and BFr(·) satisfy
BFo(g∗) = BFr(g∗)√
1+ c
1+ cg∗
· exp
{
−1
2
(
z2r
1+ cg∗
−
(
zr − zo
√
c
)2
1+ c
)}
=
√
1+ g∗ · exp
{
−1
2
· g
1+ g∗
· z2o
}
and the g∗ fulfilling this can be computed using root-finding algorithms. Note that for the
special case c = 1 this can be rearranged to
1
1+ g∗
· exp
{
−1
2
· z
2
r + z2o
1+ g∗
}
=
1√
2
· exp
{
− z
2
o
2
(
1+
(1− d)2
2
)}
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where d = θˆr/θˆo = zr/zo is the relative effect estimate. Multiplying both sides by −z2A =
−(z2r + z2o)/2 (minus the arithmetic mean of the squared z-statistics z2o and z2r ) we obtain
⇐⇒ − z
2
A
1+ g∗
· exp
{
− z
2
A
1+ g∗
}
= − z
2
A√
2
· exp
{
− z
2
o
2
(
1+
(1− d)2
2
)}
.
For q = −z2A/(1+ g∗), this reads
q · exp {q} = − z
2
A√
2
· exp
{
− z
2
o
2
(
1+
(1− d)2
2
)}
and hence application of the Lambert W function leads to the solutions
q = W
(
− z
2
A√
2
· exp
{
− z
2
o
2
(
1+
(1− d)2
2
)})
g∗ =

−z2A
q
− 1 if −z
2
A
q
≥ 1
undefined else,
with the condition that −z2A/q ≥ 1 such that g∗ is a valid relative variance, as the equation
may otherwise be satisfied for negative g∗. Since the argument to W(·) is real and negative
(if at least one of zr, zo > 0), the branches W−1 and W0 provide the two different solutions that
can fulfil the equation, provided the argument is not smaller than −e−1 (which would mean
that there are no intersections).
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